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Abstract
The interpretation of natural language utterances in argumen-
tation is largely a tacit procedure, that is to say, a procedure
transacted for the most part sublinguistically, inattentively,
automatically and involuntarily. In the particular case
of the interpretation of argumentative texts, the tacitness
thesis provides that interpreters are able to discern intended
messages without forming – and usually without being able
to – propositional representations that wholly contain their
contents. How is this done? In this paper, we propose the
following theses: (1) Interpretation can be represented as
collapse of meaning in a semantic space model. (2) Semantic
collapse, in turn, can be likened to the quantum collapse
of superpositional states of word meaning. (3) Non-trivial
structural similarities with quantum collapse are discernible
in matrix models of memory. The advantage of (3) is that
it provides independent reason to suppose that quantum
structures admit of psychological construal. The paper
concludes with suggestions for further research.
Cognitive Agency
During the past forty or so years, the study of argumenta-
tion has achieved a considerable interdisciplinary momen-
tum, impelled by important work in dialectical and dialogue
logic (Barth & Krabbe 1982), argumentation theory – which
is a loose assemblage of work by informal logicians, speech
communication theorists, critical thinking (Van Eemeren et
al. 1996) and artificial intelligence theorists (Norman &
Reed 2004). A principal departure from mainstream math-
ematical logic is the emphasis given by these accounts to
factors of agency and context. Unlike what we find in the
mainstream of mathematical logic – set theory, model the-
ory, proof theory or recursion theory – argumentation theory
gives to people a load-bearing theoretical role.
It would be wrong to leave the impression that 20th cen-
tury logic has no truck at all with agents and their cir-
cumstances. In a number of “non-classical” systems –
notably, epistemic, temporal and deontic logics – agents
have a place both notationally and semantically, although
sometimes their semantic treatment is rather slight. Agent-
relative systems that attempt to retain the basic methodolo-
gies of mathematical modeling are best seen as theories of
formal pragmatics. Thus a major change in logic in its
broader sense is its drift from an emphasis on formal se-
mantics to a focus on an encompassing formal pragmatics.
Curiously enough, in most of these agent-oriented ap-
proaches not much is to be learned of the actual constitution
of agents. In such systems a behaviour-type is analyzed by
way of a set of rules or behavioural constraints, and agents
are simply read off as those beings or devices that imple-
ment these constraints. So, for example, if a theory seeks
to investigate the principles of human reasoning, it proceeds
to lay down the norms that (it says) govern this practice,
independently of any stand-alone consideration of how the
reasoner is actually constituted, independently of what he is
interested in and able to do. Similarly, if a theory has as
its target the norms of correct argumentation, these are laid
down with scant attention at best to how human arguers are
actually put together. In virtually all such cases, the nature of
the agent is inferred from the nature of the norms purported
to govern the practice in question.
In the opinion of the present authors, it is better to re-
verse this order of precedence; that is, it is likely that one
will have a better theory of reasoning (or arguing, or de-
ciding, etc), only after determining the nature and where-
withal of actual human agents operating in real-time in the
here and now. Given this shift in analytical priority, it is
easy to see that the individual human is dominantly a being
with cognitive interests. He wants to know what to believe
and he wants to know what to do. He makes his way in
life and owes his survival and prosperity to using his head,
and he owes these uses to the way in which he is built for
them. It is also apparent that individuals transact their cog-
nitive agendas with comparatively few cognitive resources
– information, time, and storage and computational capac-
ity1. This being so, individuals tend to be proportionate in
the setting of their goals. They favour targets whose attain-
ment lies in principle within their reach. A related feature
of cognitive agency is that the resource-boundedness of hu-
man agency places the individual in a cognitive economy in
which, nearly always, resource-usage carries a cost. Overall
there is an abiding necessity to be a cognitive economizer.
1Resource-modesty often runs to outright scarcity, but in the
general case it is more a comparative matter. Contrast an indi-
vidual’s command of information, time, storage and computational
capacity with that of an institutional agent such as Nato or the In-
ternational Monetary Fund.
A further advantage of this agents-before-actions this
priority-reversal is that it opens up the study of cognitive be-
haviour, including reasoning and argumentative behaviour,
to a rich and complex body of findings from cognitive psy-
chology. Logics that take seriously input from cognitive sci-
ence have been called “practical logics of cognitive systems”
(Gabbay & Woods 2005). A major difference between, on
the one hand, the approaches to reasoning of standard logic
and those agent-relative systems which fail to make inde-
pendent provision for what agents are actually like and, on
the other, theories to which agents are admitted as they ac-
tually are, warts and all, is psychologism. Psychologism is
anathema to mainstream logicians and to those whose analy-
sis of agency is wholly implicit in what count as the theory’s
norms. For those favouring a more robust notion of agency,
psychologism is as welcome as it is unavoidable.
As the empirical record amply attests, there are a great
many “shortcuts” taken by individual agents, often exhibit-
ing the same levels of payoff had more expensive strategies
been employed (Gigerenzer 2000). Of these, we wish in this
paper to comment on two. One is the considerable savings
achieved by cognitive processings that occur sublinguisti-
cally and unconsciously or, as we might say “down below”.
Another savings, and a related one, is a discourse-economy
involving the suppression of articulation in favour of con-
textual cuing. This last is well-grounded in argumentational
practice, both in the interpretation of an interlocutor’s ut-
terances and in the content-selection of one’s own contribu-
tions.
Consider a simple-looking case. Peter and Rupert pass
in the hallway of an IT research organization. Peter, a re-
search scientist utters to Rupert, the business development
manager, “How is it going with John?” This utterance is
the tip of an ice-berg rich in implicit associations. Due to
their shared context, Peter and Rupert both know that “John”
refers to “John Smith” of “ACME Corp”, who is negotiating
a commercial license for “Guidebeam”, a next generation
web-based search technology. An interaction ensues. Pe-
ter argues that a research license should be offered to John
should he reply negatively to the commercial license. Rupert
argues to the contrary. We see in this modest exchange that
a theory of argument must take note of two aspects of ar-
gumentational practice. One is argument-interpretation, and
the other is argument-assessment, with the former taking net
analytical precedence over the latter.2
In the not so distant future our information environment
will feature all sorts of devices and displays. Even now, tech-
nologies loom in the background which process the above
argument, draw appropriate context sensitive associations in
order to flesh it out, and thereafter uses the result to query for
emails, license documents, podcasts of relevant conversa-
tions etc., and tacitly retrieves these to prime Rupert and Pe-
ter’s immediate information environment. For example, the
2’Net’ is a prudent qualification, owing to the presence in many
accounts – and, as we believe, in actual practice – of a “charity”
principle, according to which an interpretation of a person’s argu-
ment which, if generalized to his general behaviour, would make
him normatively subpar, is (defeasibly) a flawed interpretation.
licence document and associated emails could be brought up
on the wall display should they be needed for further refer-
ence in Peter and Rupert’s spontaneous hallway interaction.
It is worth noting that the historic role of logic was to
lay bare the logical structure of human reasoning. Aristotle
is clear on this point. The logic of syllogisms would serve
as the theoretical core of a wholly general theory of real-
life, two-party argumentation. Therefore, even at its his-
torical inception, natural language is central to the logic of
argumentation. This poses non-trivial challenges for tech-
nical solutions. In the day-to-day cut and thrust argumen-
tation on the ground, sentences may not conform to gram-
matical norms, thereby compromising the precision of pars-
ing technologies. What is more, the challenging problem
of semantics becomes even more vexing as important ele-
ments of the semantics are sensitive to the shared, and of-
ten quite specific context of the interlocutors. The mean-
ings of concepts and words are dynamic and have evolved
in a community of practice. Consequently, such meanings
are far more feral than the stylized examples portrayed in
linguistics text books. This, in turn, impacts on the infer-
ences drawn by the interlocutors. The role of inference is
important, since common knowledge is part and parcel of
shared context. Accordingly, as remarked above, for rea-
sons of cognitive economy, things remain unsaid, because
they are assumed known. Correct linguistic interpretation
of the argument therefore relies on drawing appropriate in-
ferences. Contrary to the syllogisms proposed by Aristotle,
these often have the character of forming tentative hypothe-
ses about the context and intentions of other speakers. In
other words, a mode of inference at play is not deduction,
but rather abduction (Gabbay & Woods 2005).
Interpreting Understatement
As noted just above, a dominant feature of communication,
including the utterances that constitute n-person argumen-
tional exchanges, is understatement. Understatements leave
parts of content unexpressed; they leave those parts unartic-
ulated. By and large, the message conveyed by an utterance
or inscription is not wholly contained in it. In the general
case no composite of the semantic interpretations of the lex-
ical items of an utterance, as ordered by the utterance’s or
inscription’s syntax, is sufficient to identify what, in making
that utterance or inscribing that text, the utterer or inscriber
has actually said. We have in this the long-recognized dis-
tinction between utterance-meaning and utter-meaning and,
relatedly, the distinction between explicit meaning and tacit
meaning. An important fact about understatements is that,
while they do not themselves say what their utters intend to
say in uttering them, this omission, typically does not pro-
duce communicational breakdown. Unlike misstatements,
understatements are not in general impediments to the con-
veyance of intended meaning. Why is this so? How does it
come to be the case that human agents are so adept at map-
ping utterances that don’t contain the intended message to
the intended message?
It is widely recognized that central to his success in effect-
ing utterance-message mappings is the interpreter’s ability
to bring to bear considerations of common knowledge, con-
textual particularities, procedural conventions and empathy,
the ability to put himself in the utterer’s or inscriber’s shoes
(Gabbay & Woods 2005, chapter 9). What is often over-
looked is the relationship in which an utterer stands to his
own choice of utterance in the light of what he intends to say.
On some tellings, the speaker has a privileged position in the
construction of his own utterance-message mappings. Intu-
itively, this might strike us as right. For doesn’t the speaker
know what he intends to communicate prior to utterance-
selection? Doesn’t the interlocutor have to wait for the ut-
terance before he takes a crack at fathoming the intended
message? On this view, an utter’s use of understatement is
discretionary, abetted by his natural interest in economizing.
Unlike his interlocutor, the utterer himself always possesses
the wherewithal to embed the totality of his message in an
utterance, albeit a longer one than he would normally have
occasion to make in actual practice. But, again, there is little
in the empirical record to sustain this opinion. (How often
do we hear: “I didn’t know what I wanted to say until the
words were out of my mouth”?) For utterer and interlocutor
alike, for both an utterer’s utterance-message mappings as
well as the hearer’s decoding of them, a good deal of what
happens happens down below – unconsciously inattentively,
involuntarily and sublinguistically. It would appear, then,
that the apparent asymmetry of access to intended meaning
is largely an illusion. In attaching a speaker’s meaning to
his utterance or inscription, it is true that an interpreter is
responsive to factors of context, common knowledge, pro-
cedural conventions, as well as approaching his task as an
empathist. But in the general case, these factors operate
in ways that outreach the agent’s command and awareness.
As for the speaker himself, he seeks for an utterance or in-
scription which, models those very same factors of context,
common knowledge and so on, will convey the very mes-
sage that a successful interpreter will be able to discern.
Whereas the interpreter moves from utterance or inscrip-
tion + these other features to message, the speaker moves
from message + those other factors to utterance or inscrip-
tion. Speakers and interpreters perform the converses of one
another’s tasks. This being so, in the interest of space we
can now confine our remarks to follow on the interpreter’s
role in construing an utterance.
As briefly mentioned above, it has recently been pro-
posed that the structure of inscription-interpretation is use-
fully modelled as a form of abductive inference. Informally
speaking, what makes interpretations abductive is that they
are inferred on the basis of their contribution to the over-
all coherence and efficacy of the discourse goals presently
in play. A simple example will illustrate this point. When
presented with the utterance, “How can you say that?”, it
bears on its interpretation that it arises in the context of
a dispute rather than in the context of a language-learning
class. Whatever may be said for the thesis of interpretation-
as-abduction, it remains the case that the dynamics of speech
interpretation are very complex, especially given the hidden-
ness of the various factors that operate down below.
It is well-known among AI theorists that there are no easy
ways in which to automatically unpack the messages em-
bedded in utterance and render them into propositional form.
This is a considerable problem for the mechanization of tex-
tual interpretation. Since argument interpretation carries dif-
ficulties of its own, it remains a particularly serious problem
in that context as well. What we nowwish to do is to turn our
attention to the dynamics of down below as they bear upon
the difficult problem of the interpretation of texts, for which
we shall employ semantic space models which are compu-
tational models of word meaning from the field of cognitive
science.
The problem that motivates the semantic space approach
is that when AI researchers build systems that are able to
reason over substantial texts, the deployment of techniques
for the propositional representation of the message embed-
ded in the text fails to achieve the objective in a satisfactory
way. Even so, on the assumption that texts embed messages
of some sort, and on the further assumption that textual inter-
pretation and inference somehow “gets at” those messages,
it is reasonable that a message representation capability of a
non-propositional kind. Accordingly, a semantic space anal-
ysis of textual interpretation may be viewed as a contribu-
tion to a “logic of down below” (Bruza, Widdows, & Woods
2008). As we shall see two sections hence, a distinctive fea-
ture of our semantic space approach is the tie it postulates
between the interpretation of natural language argumenta-
tion and what physicists call quantum collapse. It is our
further conjecture that the creative inarticulacies involved in
both the understated transmission and interpretation of mes-
sages has a natural explanation in a semantic space model
subject to these same quantum constraints.
Semantic Space
Cognitive scientists have produced an ensemble of models
which have an encouraging, and at times impressive, track
record of replicating human information processing, such as
word associations norms. These models are generally re-
ferred to as semantic space. As used here, the term “seman-
tic” derives from the intuition that the meaning of a word de-
rives from the “company it keeps”, as the linguist J.R. Firth
(1890-1960) famously remarked.
Although the details of the various semantic space mod-
els differ, they all process a corpus of text and “learn” rep-
resentations of words in high dimensional space. Seman-
tic space models are interesting in light of the scenario pre-
sented above, since they open the door to gaining operational
command of socio-cognitive “meanings” in a community of
practice together with mechanisms to replicate our ability to
draw context-sensitive associations within the scheme of an
argument, or dialogue.
To illustrate how the gap between socio-cognitive se-
mantics and actual computational representations may be
bridged, the Hyperspace Analogue to Language (HAL) se-
mantic space model is employed (Burgess, Livesay, & Lund
1998). HAL constructs a matrix whereby the columns and
rows correspond to words and the values of a cell represents
the strength of co-occurrence of one word seen in the context
of another. The strengths are computed by sliding a context
window of fixed size over the text by one word increment
ignoring punctuation, sentence and paragraph boundaries.
All words within the window are considered as co-occurring
with the last word in the window with a strength inversely
proportional to the distance between the words. Remem-
bering Firth’s quotation above, all words in a given context
window are the “company” of the last word in the window.
Intuitively, if the window size is set too large, spurious co-
occurrence associations are represented in the matrix. Con-
versely, if the window size is too small, relevant associations
may be missed. In most studies, a window size of between
eight and ten has proved optimal. Consider the trace “Pres-
ident Reagan ignorant of the arms scandal”. Table depicts
the HAL matrix of the example trace with a window size
of five. Each row i in a HAL matrix represents accumu-
arms ig of pres reag scand the
arms 0 3 4 1 2 0 5
ig 0 0 0 4 5 0 0
of 0 5 0 3 4 0 0
pres 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
reag 0 0 0 5 0 0 0
scand 5 2 3 0 1 0 4
the 0 4 5 2 3 0 0
Table 1: A simple semantic space computed by HAL
lated weighted associations of word i with respect to other
words which preceded i in a context window. Conversely,
column i represents accumulated weighted associations with
words that appeared after i in a window. If the word order
is not of interest, the matrix can be added to its transpose
giving rise to a symmetric matrix. A given column vector
then represents the “meaning” of the word associated with
the column. The semantic association between two words
a and b can then be computed by measuring the cosine of
the angle between the corresponding vector representations
- the smaller the angle the stronger the semantic association.
An alternative measure of semantic association used in the
literature is the Euclidean distance between the vector repre-
sentations of a and b. Irrespective of the means employed to
compute semantic association, semantic space is clumpy –
words with similar meaning will tend to cluster. A semantic
space like a HAL matrix can be dimensionally reduced via
for example, singular value decomposition, a theorem from
linear algebra. Replication of a variety of human informa-
tion processing tasks relies on dimension reduction as it ap-
parently picks up higher order associations between words
which are not captured by straight co-occurrence.
Semantic space models like HAL are normally run over
a large corpus of text, sometimes millions of words. In this
way, a global semantic space can be computed, which has
been of most interest to those cognitive scientists who de-
ploy semantic space models to replicate aspects of human
information processing. It is important to bear in mind the
word “meanings” are relative to the corpus. Consider a com-
munity of practice. A corpus quite naturally develops around
it in the form of electronic documents, emails, on-line post-
ings to a forum, etc. This corpus can be used to compute a
semantic space. In this case, the “meanings” of the words
are relative to the community - they are computational ap-
proximations of socio-cognitive meanings harboured by the
human agents in the community. What is more, these mean-
ings are not fixed, they will evolve as the corpus evolves.
Bear in mind, these meanings have been computed with-
out grammatical processing and by their very nature are rich
in associations. This reflects cognition itself whereby it is
purported that the upper symbolic level level of cognition
is where higher order linguistic structures are manipulated,
such as propositional representation. In the level below, con-
cepts are purported to a have a geometric a representation
whereby notions such as context-senstive similarity are nat-
urally expressed (Ga¨rdenfors 2000). In other words, seman-
tic space would seem to be an appropriate computational ap-
proximation of the sublinguistic issues involved in interpre-
tation mentioned above.
Interpretation and Collapse of Meaning
A big question lurking in the scenario-argument previously
sketched is how to effectively model the interplay between
meaning, context and human abductive inference in relation
to interpretation. Surprisingly, quantum mechanics (QM)
gives rise to some innovative and possibly ground breaking
answers in relation to this challenging question. In recent
times there have been number of speculative attempts to ex-
plore the connection between density matrices and semantic
space models (Aerts & Czachor 2004; Bruza & Cole 2005;
Widdows & Bruza 2007). In these works, a word in seman-
tic space may be likened to a quantum particle in the fol-
lowing sense. In the absence of context it is in a superposed
state - it is a collection of all the possible meanings of the
word. Seeing the word in context, however, gives rise to
a “collapse” of potential meanings onto an actual one. As
mentioned above, this collapse of meaning happens “down
below” – it is a prevalent, unnoticed facet of interpretation
during argumentation.
Suppose that an argument begins with the affirmation
“Reagan got it wrong with Iran”. The word “Reagan” has
several possible senses, or basis states. For example, there
is the run of mill Presidential Reagan dealing with congress,
Reagan’s trade war with Japan, the Iran-Contra scandal, and
even the sense pertaining to the aircraft carrier U.S.S Ronald
Reagan. When encountering “Reagan” in the context of
“Iran”, a collapse of meaning occurs onto the basis state cor-
responding to the Iran-Contra scandal. As mentioned previ-
ously, a density matrix representing a basis state has a single
eigenvector. This matters, since the eigenvector is a source
of relevant context-sensitive associations to the Iran-Contra
scandal such as “arms”, “scandal”, “illegal” etc.
The density matrix corresponding to the word “Reagan”
can be constructed as a linear combination of density matri-
ces, each corresponding to a given sense. Consider the traces
“President Reagan was ignorant about much of the Iran arms
scandal”, “Reagan says U.S to offer missile treaty”, “Reagan
seeks more aid for Central America”, “Kemp urges Reagan
to oppose stock tax”. A symmetric HAL matrix can be com-
puted from each of these. As more traces are encountered, it
becomes clear that they start to cluster and a sense begins to
emerge – for example, “Reagan” in the Iran-Contra sense,
the missile treaty with the Soviets, etc. Each sense can be
represented as a density matrix which is quite easily derived
from summing the HAL matrices of the associated traces. In
addition, a probability can be ascribed the to a given sense.
For example, the density matrix ρr for the meaning of the
word “Reagan” can be formalized at the following linear
combination:
ρr = p1ρ1 + . . . pmρm
where each ρi is a basis state representing one of the m
senses of the word “Reagan” and the probabilities pi sum
to unity. This is fully in accord with QM whereby a density
matrix can be expressed as a weighted combination of den-
sity matrices corresponding to basis states (senses). There
is no requirement that the eigenvectors of the basis states be
orthogonal to one another.
This is a very important point. Intuitively, it is unrealistic
to require the senses of a word meaning be mutually orthog-
onal. The above equation is depicted in figure 1.
A striking aspect of figure 1 is its similarity to a matrix
model of human memory published in the psychological lit-
erature (Humphreys, Bain, & Pike 1989). Seen this way,
the density matrix comprises vertical slices, each slice corre-
sponding to a sense (basis). The analog in the matrix model
of memory is a tensor of rank 3, which has a three dimen-
sional structure. Rank-three memory is a superposition of
memory traces. For accessing episodic memories (memo-
ries of specific events), a context vector is required. This is
relevant to our account, as the Iran-Contra scandal can be
considered as a specific event. In the density matrix repre-
sentation, each vertical slice corresponds to a context, and in
the terminology of the matrix model of human memory, the
eigenvector of the slice, can be considered a context vector.
The collapse of meaning
The intuition we will attempt to develop is the collapse of
word meaning due to context is akin to a cued-recall retrieval
operation from human memory. More specifically, context
is modelled a projection operator which is applied to a given
density matrix corresponding to the state of a word mean-
ing resulting in its “collapse”. The probability of collapse p
is a function of the scalar quantity resulting from matching.
The analogy with orthodox QM is the following - a projec-
tion operator models a measurement on a quantum particle
resulting in a collapse onto a basis state.
In the matrix model of memory (Humphreys, Bain, &
Pike 1989) , memory representations can include items, con-
texts or, combinations of items and contexts (associations).
Items can comprise stimuli, words, or concepts. Each item
is modelled as a vector of feature weights. Feature weights
are used to specify the degree to which certain features form
part of an item. There are two possible levels of vector rep-
resentation for items. These include:
• modality specific peripheral representations (e.g.,
graphemic or phonemic representations of words)
• modality independent central representations (e.g., se-
mantic representations of words)
Our discussion will focus on the latter, given the assump-
tion that semantic spaces deliver semantic representations of
words.
Memories are associative by nature, and unique represen-
tations are created by combining features of items and con-
texts. Several different types of associations are possible.
The association of interest in our running example is a two
way association between a word “Reagan” and a context
word “Iran”. In the matrix model of memory, an associa-
tion between context and a word is represented by an outer
product of the vectors corresponding the meanings of “Rea-
gan” and “Iran”. Seeing a given word (a target) in the con-
text of other words (cue) forms an association which probes
memory. The object being probed is a density matrix corre-
sponding to a word or concept, the meaning of which, as we
have seen, is a superposition. As in orthodox QM, the probe
can be formalized as a projection operator which essentially
retrieves a particular slice from figure 1. In this case, the
collapse of meaning is total. In other words, no ambiguity
remains about the state of the word’s meaning.
Motivating the collapse of meaning using the matrix
model of memory introduces a deviation from orthodox QM.
The measurement devices in QM are precise in the sense
that a measurement collapses a quantum particle onto a ba-
sis state. Context, however, can be imprecise. For exam-
ple, there are actually two senses of “Reagan” in the context
of “Iran”. The first, and more probable sense, associates
with the Iran-Contra scandal. The other is the freeing of
the hostages from the American embassy in Teheran at the
beginning of Reagan’s presidency. In terms of the figure
above, what is retrieved from memory by the probe is a mix-
ture of two slices, one slice (basis state) corresponding to
each of the two senses just mentioned. In quantum termi-
nology, the result of the measurement is a superposition, not
a basis state, albeit that the resulting superposition involves
far fewer possible senses that the original. In other words,
the collapse of meaning is not total.
Conceptualizing interpretation in this way aligns well
with the issues of cognitive economy and abduction men-
tioned above. If the the collapse is not complete, it is eco-
nomic to “clean up” the resulting superposition by inatten-
tively hypothesizing (“abducing”) the most probable sense,
especially if one sense has a significantly higher probability
than others. If this condition is not met, the interpreter may
then resort to the more cognitively demanding mode of in-
terrogation characterized by “What do you mean by X?”. It
is not hard to imagine that such heuristics could be deployed
in a computational argumentation system based on density
matrices derived from semantic space around a community
of practice.
More generally, the study of faulty projection operators on
human memory may generate some insights into the errors
humans make in inference. If the interpreter does not resort
to interrogation, then they may “clean up” the resulting su-
perposition by “abducing” the wrong sense, which in turn
leads to inappropriate context-sensitive associations being
produced “down below”. It may well be that these feed into
higher level inference processes at the symbolic level of cog-
nition and thus ultimately lead to the drawing of erroneous
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Figure 1: ρr: the density matrix representation of the meaning of “Reagan”
conclusions within the scheme of the argument. Viewed this
way, many so-called errors of inference may have little to do
with inference at all, but rather faulty collapse of meaning in
memory. In is interesting to note that some studies of ana-
logical mapping show analogical reasoning is confounded
with processes in human memory. The same may also be
said in regard to default reasoning. When confronted with
the utterance, “Tweety is a bird”, the interpreter will likely
hold the hypothesis that “Tweety flies”. However, when con-
fronted with the subsequent utterance, “No, Tweety is a pen-
guin”, the interpreter will drop the hypothesis. The subfield
of Artificial Intelligence known has non-montonic reasoning
proliferates with studies of the reasoning processes underly-
ing such examples. It is debatable, however, as to whether
any reasoning is actually going on. The example can be ex-
plained in terms of two probes to memory resulting in two
collapses of meaning of “Tweety”.
Summary and Outlook
It is widely accepted that much of a human agent’s cognitive
behaviour involves appreciations of and responses to con-
texts, meaninings, memories and intentions – as well as of
targets and their standards of attainmant – that are implicit.
Owing to the resource-limitations characteristic of individ-
ual agency, the present authors conceive of the processes of
cognition “down below” as strategies that abet the agent’s
interest in using his scant resources with requisite economy.
Such strategies are, first and foremost, fast. Since operations
down below are dominantly sublinguistic, it is necessary to
postulate cognitive devices and procedures that are put into
play without the necessity of propositional representation.
In the particular case of the interpretation of an argumen-
tative text, these same factors are also dominantly present.
This being so, the human cognizer manages to grasp the
message conveyed by such a text without contriving a – and
in, in general, without being able to – a propositional expres-
sion of it,
It is hardly surprising that the mechanics of cognitive
behaviour down below present the experimental psycholo-
gist with challenges so robust that the entire field is still
presently much terra incognita. Ethical considerations alone
are an experimental deterrent. Accordingly until these im-
pediments are more effectively subdued, the logic of down
below – and its role in a comprehensive theory of argument-
interpretation – must be largely conjectural, that is to say,
an exercise in theoretical abduction. What is needed for the
task at hand is a model of textual interpretation that takes
these attributes and constraints seriously into account. The
semantic space model certainly fits this bill, and it has to
our mind the further advantage of giving to associationist
assumptions a credible theoretical role.
On the approach developed here, interpretation is seman-
tic collapse. Taken on its own, “quantum collapse” of mean-
ing is a metaphor, albeit an attractive one. Without further
explication, it is a metaphor in no fit state to bear theoreti-
cal burdens that we intend for it. Accordingly, our further
abduction is that semantic collapse is a form of the quantum
collapse of superpositions, except that the orthogonality re-
quirement of the latter is given a somewhat relaxed provi-
dence as regards the former. If the quantum explication of
semantic collapse holds water, then a good deal can be in-
ferred about how textual interpretations are achieved. This
is advantage enough to discourage dismissal of the quantum
hypothesis out of hand. Another advantage of the quantum
collapse hypothesis is its apparent conformity with the ma-
trix model of memory developed in the psychological litera-
ture. In any case, it is easy to see why this is a similarity from
which the present authors would derive some comfort. The
packaging, storage and retrieval of memories is a paradigm
of cognitive processing down below. The structural similar-
ities between the matrix model of memory and the quantum
collapse treatment of the semantic space model is especially
welcome, if for no other reason than that it provides inde-
pendent reason for supposing quantum structures capable of
bearing non-trivial psychological readings.
We offer the hypotheses developed here without categor-
ical assurance, and certainly not as the final world. Their
intended function is the stimulation of further enquiry. On
our own agenda is the investigation of Nelson & McEvoys’s
(Nelson &McEvoy 2007; Bruza et al. 2008) linking of word
association and quantum entanglement, as well as the possi-
bility of embedding the down below aspects of error in a
general account of that subject. The value of the former
project speaks for itself. The interest of the second requires a
word or two of explanation. In (Gigerenzer 2000)and (Gab-
bay & Woods 2007), it is observed that certain classes of er-
ror have the net advantage of facilitating speedy and accurate
learning. This leaves the question as to whether these con-
structive errors are random occurrences – luck of the draw –
or whether somehow the human agent is adept at “selecting”
them. If the latter obtains, it is plainly a further datum for
the logic of down below.
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